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Abstract 
In 1997 Chancellor Kohl proposed a major pension reform: he pushed the law through Parliament 
explaining that the German PAYG system had become unsustainable. One limitation of the new law - 
one that is crucial for our identification strategy - is that it left the generous pension entitlements of 
civil servants intact. The year after, in 1998, Kohl lost the elections and was replaced by Gerhard 
Shroeder. One of the first decisions of the new Chancellor was to revoke of the 1997 pension reform. 
We use the quasi-experiment of the adoption and subsequent revocation of the pension reform to 
study how households reacted to the increase in uncertainty about the future path of income that such 
an event produced. Our estimates are obtained from a diff-in-diff estimator: this helps us overcome 
the identification problem that often affects measures of precautionary saving. Departing from the 
majority of studies on precautionary saving we also analyze households' response in terms of labor 
market choices: we find evidence of a labor supply response by those workers who can use the margin 
offered by part-time employment. 
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1 Introduction
Prolonged political debates about how to reform a country’s system of public wel-
fare are common in many countries. Reform reversals, that is the adoption by one
government of new welfare rules and their revocation by a subsequent government,
are also not infrequent. Underlying these experiences is often a ‘war of attrition’
among various groups in society, each trying to protect themselves and to shift the
burden of the reforms on someone else. A typical case are reforms of pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) pension systems in countries where population growth is decelerating. There
is rarely a disagreement on the need to change the existing rules, but as one reform
plan after the other is considered, decisions often keep being been postponed because
political parties are unable to agree on how the burden should be shared between
various groups in society and in particular between the young and the old 1. On some
occasions pension reforms adopted by one government are revoked by another–this
happened in Germany in 1998, the case studied in this paper, and in Italy ten years
later.
In Germany the need to reform the PAYG pension rules came to the forefront of
the public debate in 1997 when Chancellor Kohl announced a major reform explaining
that the existing system was unsustainable: under the existing rules public spending
on pensions would increase from 12% of GDP in 2000 to 17% in 2050 (OECD, 2005).
By then payroll contribution rates to the State pension system would need to reach
25%, from 18% in the mid-1990s (Borsh-Supan, 2003). The reform adopted by Kohl
addressed these issues restricting the accrual of pension rights not based on contribu-
tions and gradually reducing the replacement rate from 70% to 67%. Over time the
new law would have stabilized the payroll contribution rate at around 21% (Schulze
and Jochem, 2007). One limitation of Kohl’s reform–one that will be crucial for
our identification strategy–is that it left the generous pension entitlements of civil
servants intact.
In 1998, the year after his reform had been passed into legislation by parliament,
Helmut Kohl lost the elections and was replaced by Gerhard Shroeder. One of the
first decisions of the new government was to revoke of the 1997 pension reform act.
People do not simply sit and wait. The reversal of a previously adopted reform–
1Boeri, Borsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001), using survey data, analyze the opinions of European
citizens regarding pension reform trying to understand why a political consensus is so diﬃcult to
achieve. They find that conflicts of interests over welfare reform are generally aligned along three
main dimensions: age, income, and the insider/outsider status in the labor market.
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especially when, as in Germany, the urgency of the reform had been motivated arguing
that the system in place was unsustainable–raises the uncertainty that households
face regarding their future. This paper uses the quasi-experiment of the adoption and
subsequent revocation of the Kohl pension reform to study how German households
reacted to this event that we interpret as having produced an increase in uncertainty
about the future of existing pension rules, and thus about the future path of household
income. We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator: the two periods are the years
preceding and following the revocation of the reform; the control group consists of
those individuals unaﬀected by the Kohl pension reform, in particular civil servants.
We use fixed eﬀects to control for unobservable characteristics, such as diﬀerences
across individuals in the degree of risk aversion.
Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) use a diﬀ-in-diﬀ approach to show that Italian
households substituted higher private pension wealth for the lower social security
pension wealth following the 1992 pension reform in Italy. Our results provide direct
evidence on the extent to which an increase in uncertainty about the path of future
household income raises precautionary saving. (Carroll and Kimball, 2006 in their
Palgrave entry define precautionary saving as “additional saving that results from
the knowledge that the future is uncertain.”) Fuchs-Schudeln and Schudeln (2005)
find evidence consistent with a precautionary saving motive in Germany analyzing
the same micro data we use in this paper but looking at a diﬀerent experiment:
German reunification. In a paper that is closer in spirit to ours, Murata (2003) finds
evidence consistent with precautionary saving in a cross-section analysis of the answers
given by a sample of Japanese households to a questionnaire in which they were
asked about their perceived uncertainty regarding future pension benefits. Gourinchas
and Parker (2001) provide structural estimates of a dynamic stochastic model of
households expenditure over the life cycle with uninsurable labour income uncertainty.
They show that the precautionary saving motive is especially important at young ages
while it becomes negligible for older households who, on average, hold large amounts
of liquid wealth. The results are derived using a definition of wealth that excludes
social security, and the authors suggest that the age pattern of precautionary saving
produced by their model could be reversed if uncertainty concerning pension wealth
was introduced. Our data allows to test whether the precautionary saving induced
by the uncertainty regarding the future of pensions aﬀects individuals diﬀerently
depending on their age. Finally, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) use a diﬀ-in-diﬀ
approach to show that Italian households substituted higher private pension wealth
for reduction in social security wealth following the 1992 pension reform.
3
Additional savings can be achieved either by consuming less or by working more.
Departing from the majority of studies on precautionary saving we also analyze house-
holds’ response in terms of their labour market choices: hours worked in the primary
and (possibly) in secondary jobs by all working household members.
Our results support the view that the policy uncertainty induced by stop-and-go
reforms lowered private consumption contributing to the slowdown of the German
economy at the start of this millennium. (The household saving rate, as a share
of disposable income, increased in Germany precisely at the time of the debate sur-
rounding pension reform: from below 10% of disposable income in the mid 1990’s to
11% at the start of the millennium; something similar also happened in Japan). We
find that German PAYG workers, the large majority in the population, saved more.
For instance, a household that previously was holding savings constant at 9.8% of
disposable income (the average saving rate in our balanced sample in 1998) would,
ceteris paribus, have a saving rate of about 13.7% by the year 2000. Households
whose pension status was aﬀected by the Kohl reform and by its subsequent reversal
also worked more, exploiting the margin provided by part-time employment. For
instance, a head of household working part-time, who previously worked 22 hours per
week (the average part-time hours per week in our balanced sample in 1998), would
increase her hours to 26 hours per week.
2 A Quasi-Natural Experiment
We study how households’ saving and labor supply decisions respond to an increase
in uncertainty about the future of pension rules exploiting data from a German quasi-
natural experiment. During the 1990’s Germany went through two distinct periods
in the discussion about the reform of its PAYG public pension system. A long debate
that increased the public’s awareness about the unsustainability of the existing rules
was followed by a rather comprehensive reform; a year later the reform was unex-
pectedly revoked. We use the timing of the announced reform and of its subsequent
revocation, and the fact that not all German households were aﬀected by the reform,
to identify the eﬀects of the increase in uncertainty induced by the policy reversal.
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Up to 1997 the sustainability of the PAYG pension system was not a big public
issue in Germany. It was rarely discussed and the general public was largely
unaware of the inevitable need to reform the system;
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2. August 1997: Chancellor Kohl in a widely reported speech announces a major
reform explaining that the existing rules are no longer sustainable. The Kohl
reform was put into legislation in December 1997 (des Rentenreformgesetzes
1999, December 16, 1997). The main provision of the new law was the indexation
of pension benefits to future gains in life-expectancy: over time this provision
would have reduced the replacement rate from 70% to 67%. The law was due
to come into eﬀect in 1999.
Earlier in the same year–at the end of January 1997–a reform of the rules
governing public sector employment (Gesetz zur Reform des öﬀentlichen Dien-
strechts) had been adopted, which had come into force on July 1, 1997. The
main purpose of the law was to create a more market-driven system for career
civil servants, to introduce flexibility in work practices and performance-related
pay, and to increase mobility across jobs. Among the many provisions of this
law was a measure which marginally modified the rules of civil service pensions,
2 but de-facto safeguarded the generosity of the system going forward, and more
importantly insulated civil servants from the eﬀects of reforms of the PAYG sys-
tem that might be introduced in the future –and indeed the subsequent Kohl
reform did not apply to civil servants;
3. September 1998: Gerhard Schroeder surprisingly wins the general election. One
of the first decisions of the new Chancellor is to revoke Kohl’s pension reform
(Rentenkorrekturgesetz, November 20, 1998). The revocation was not accompa-
nied by the announcement of an alternative plan: thus the German public is left
with the awareness that the PAYG system is unsustainable but with no plans
for changing its rules. Despite the revocation being an election promise, the
outcome of the election was unexpected. We use September 1998 as the point
at which the uncertainty over the future of the social security system increased;
4. May 2001: the reform process resumes. A new pension scheme, the Riester
reform, is adopted. Along with a gradual reduction of benefits, from 70 to 67
percent of average net earnings by 2030, the law also encouraged enrollment in
private pension plans.
Based on this sequence of events we define the following timing for our policy
variables.
2The reform involved civil servants contributing to the financing of their pensions through a fixed
reduction of 0.2% in the annual pay every year between 2001 and 2016.
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• For households in which the head of the household is a civil servant (as we shall
see our saving data refer to the entire household) we define a reform variable:
cs_reformt =
(
1 after January 1997
0 otherwise
• For the all other households, i.e. those in which the head-of-household is not a
civil servant, we define two variables. The first identifies the Kohl reform, the
second its revocation:
reformt =
(
1 between August 1997 and September 1998
0 otherwise
revoket =
(
1 between September 1998 and April 2001
0 otherwise
2.1 Treated and controls
Various groups in German society were aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by Kohl’s reform
and by its subsequent revocation:
PAYG individuals: In Germany, membership in the PAYG public pension system
is mandatory for almost all workers 3. The majority of the individuals in our
sample (about 64% in 1998) fall into this general category. These are the people
directly aﬀected by Kohl’s reform and thus constitute our “treated” group.
Civil servants: German civil service pensions are run separately from the PAYG
system. As we discussed, the rules that apply to the rather generous pensions of
civil servants were exempted from the reform-revoke-reform process. Households
headed by civil servants constitute our main “control” group.
Beyond these two groups there are four other categories which were only marginally—
if at all—aﬀected by the reform.
Those planning to leave Germany: These are foreign nationals who are in Ger-
many temporarily, or who in any case expect to leave Germany before retire-
ment. If a person who has contributed to the public pension system leaves
Germany before they can claim their pension, there are rules in place to treat
3To be eligible for a pension a worker’s earnings must be above a certain threshold. Our sample
however only includes households with positive savings: it is thus likely that all the individuals in
the treated group will be part of the public pension system.
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their accrued pension wealth fairly. These rules diﬀer depending on where the
person moves to: if they move to another EU country, then the years of pen-
sion contribution in Germany could count toward a public pension at home. If
instead the person moves to outside the EU they can generally claim their con-
tributions back. In either case, such a worker is likely to be less aﬀected (if at
all) by changes to the German public pension system. We identify these people
using a specific question–asked only of foreign nationals–as to whether they
intend to stay in Germany over the long term. In our benchmark specification
we include “German leavers” in the control group.
Self-employed: These workers can choose whether or not they wish to join the
public pension system. This group will thus contain some members who are
aﬀected by the reform and others who are not.
Professionals: Lawyers, accountants, vets, doctors, etc. are required to join private
pension plans. This group is thus unaﬀected by a reform of the public pension
system.
Pensioners: Most proposed reforms of the pension system protect the benefits of
those already in retirement. Pensioners should thus be unaﬀected by such re-
forms.
We also experiment with (a) an extended treated group which also includes the
self-employed, and professionals, and (b) excluding those who plan to leave Germany
from the control group.
The diﬀ-in-diﬀ estimator that we shall use relies on the assumption that prior to
the treatment households in the treated and in the control group are indistinguishable,
i.e. that the treatment is random. In other words, that households headed by a civil
servant are similar to all other households except for the fact that they are headed by
a civil servant–and thus are shielded from the eﬀects of the Kohl reform. We have
checked this assumption looking at “propensity scores”. These are reported in Figure
1.
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 shows the estimated probability of not being
treated measured from a panel logit regression of “not being treated”–that is being
headed by a civil servant–on various controls including a household fixed eﬀect. The
vertical axis shows the percent of households in each group. We find controls and
treated groups close to both extremes of the estimated probabilities of treatment. In
the top-left panel, for instance, we find that there are household heads in the general
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population (PAYG individuals, a category which does not include civil servants) that
have a high probability of being treated, that is whose characteristics closely match
those of the treated group, namely civil servants. Symmetrically, the bottom-right
panel of the figure shows that there are households headed by a civil servant who,
considering their characteristics, might have been treated. This reassures us that the
two groups are not too diﬀerent from each other–that is that the assumption that
the treatment is random is not too extreme.
[Insert Figure 1] 
3 Data
Our data are from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). This survey, first
conducted in 1984, is an annual longitudinal study which now covers some 10,000
German households providing information on numerous aspects of their life, including
household composition, family biographies, employment, social security, earnings and
health. The number of households surveyed rises over time since subsequent waves
have increased the coverage of the sample, and attrition rates are low. Balanced
samples over a suﬃciently long number of years are relatively small: when we restrict
our analysis to households who report their savings, the size of a balanced panel
covering the 6-year period 1995-2000 contains 2,854 households yielding a total of
about 17,000 observations.
Two main surveys are conducted each year. The first is an individual question-
naire in which all adult household members answer questions regarding their own
situation. The second is a household questionnaire in which the head of the house-
hold is asked questions regarding the entire household. We combine the information
from the two questionnaires. From the first we obtain information about the head
and other members of the household: age, education and employment status, which
defines the future pension status, hours worked, etc. for each individual. From the
second, we obtain information relating to the entire household: income, household
taxes paid (including a separate measure of social security contributions), pension
income received from both public and private sources, as well as demographic infor-
mation such as marital status, number of children, area of residence, etc. The concept
of saving we use thus refers to the entire household. The pension status, and whether
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or not it is aﬀected by the reforms, refers only to the head of the household. 4 5
The GSOEP survey is generally conducted early in the year, although some re-
spondents are interviewed as late as October and November. Using an “interview
month” identifier, we can tell whether at the time of the interview the respondent
was aware of the Kohl reform (announced during the month of August 1997) and of
its subsequent recall (expected after the September 1998 election).
We construct a balanced sample using six waves of the GSOEP survey: those from
1995 (two years before the Kohl reform) to 2000 (the year before the Reister Law).
Table 1 reports the number of observations available each year 6 and those included
in the balance sample: 4.532. The table also describes the characteristics of these
households: the characteristics of households included in the balanced panel reflect
their responses in 1998. The household proportions in terms of the key variables in
the balanced sample are similar to those in the overall data. In particular, the split
by labour force status (middle panel) and public pension status (bottom panel) is
reasonably constant over the course of the sample. 
3.1 Household saving
The GSOEP survey asks about household savings posing the following question: “Do
you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the month that you can
save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth?” The answer to
4Our control group could include households that are headed by a civil servant—and thus should
in principle be shielded from the reforms–but in which some other household member has a job
that qualifies for a public pension. The saving of such a household could thus be aﬀected by the
uncertainty associated with the status of one of its members. For this reason in Table 6 (column 5)
we show the results we obtain when we include in the control group only those households in which
there is a single worker: the civil servant who heads them.
5We also make use of the variables contained in the Cross-National Equivalent File (CNEF).
These data are also based on the GSOEP responses, but are constructed ex-post in order to provide
variables that are comparable with the British Household Panel and Panel Study on Income and
Dynamics (PSID) - see Burkhauser et al. (2001) for details. The variable we use to measure social
security contributions comes from this dataset.
6The numbers in this table may diﬀer slightly from those in the GSOEP survey because some
observations cannot be used in our sample as they lack data on key variables, or are only observed
for one year.
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this question is our main household saving variable 7, which we then express as a per-
centage of household disposable income or, alternatively, of household consumption.
One problem with our survey data concerns those households who do not save.
The GSOEP survey reports saving only for those households that declare positive
saving: if a household has zero or negative saving, the question about saving is left
unanswered or a zero is entered. Income is instead reported for all households. The
number of households for which there is no information about saving is significant:
for instance 1,678 out of 4,532 households in the balanced sample in 1998, or about
40% (see the top panel of Table 1). Among the heads of household who do not report
saving 14% (in the balanced sample in 1998) are unemployed, 22% are retired and 11%
are otherwise out of the labour force (these compare to 8%, 25% and 8% respectively
in the entire 1998 sample). The percentage of non-savers is reasonably constant along
the age distribution. We proceed in two ways, both excluding households who do not
report their savings and, alternatively, attributing to such households an estimated
saving rate. To do this, we proceed as follows.
We start from households who declare positive saving and compute consumption
as income minus saving (consumption is not reported in the survey). We then use
these data on consumption to estimate a consumption function. The arguments in
the estimated consumption function are income, a measure of wealth, expenditure
on specific items such as food, demographic variables and personal characteristics.8
Using the estimated parameters of this consumption function we then construct an
estimate of consumption for those households who did not report saving and for whom
we only have information on income and on the other arguments in our consumption
function. Using reported income and these estimates of consumption we finally obtain
an estimate of saving. The results (not reported here but available in an Appendix
posted on our websites 9), are little changed when we use the sample which also
7This variable is a measure of the flow counterpart to household wealth which would be the most
desirable variable to analyse. Fuchs and Fuchs-Schudeln (2005) construct an estimate of household
financial wealth interpolating a measure of asset income by assuming that each household receives
an average return from the assets it holds. Such a definition however is subject to measurement
error. The same asset stock will in general yield diﬀerent returns, depending on the particular asset
composition: if this happened, households with identical stocks of assets would be attributed diﬀerent
stocks. The measure of saving reported in the GSOEP survey is immune from this problem since the
question is directly about additions to the stock of wealth.
8Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003), amongst others, discuss the issue of imputing consumption
using similar household surveys.
9http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=4063&tbn=albero&id_doc=177
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includes estimated negative saving by households who do not report saving.
A second problem with our definition of saving arises from the PAYG pension sys-
tem. The answers to the question about saving miss two portions of actual household
saving. First, social security contributions by workers and by firms 10, which are not
reported as savings although they are a form of saving (which increases with income).
Thus reported savings increase over a person’s working life by less than “true” sav-
ing. Second, the pension payments an individual receives are mis-reported as income,
rather than being considered negative savings. Thus reported savings remain positive
even after retirement when actual savings are likely to be negative 11. A similar prob-
lem arises for private pension plans. In the GSOEP survey, individual contributions
to such plans are correctly reported as saving 12, but money withdrawn from a private
plan is incorrectly reported as income. The bottom line is that the savings reported
in the GSOEP answers represent a fraction of actual household saving.
This problem emerges clearly from Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the age pro-
file of the German saving rate (defined as the ratio of reported saving to disposable
income) in 2002 13. This age profile is at odds with the life cycle hypothesis: the dif-
ference is particularly sharp when we compare it with the U.S. profile obtained from
the PSID survey (also shown in Figure 2 and reported in Poterba, 1994). Rather
than hump-shaped, as implied by the life-cycle hypothesis, the saving rate of Ger-
man households seems to be unaﬀected by an individual’s age 14. Figure 2 shows
the saving rate once we correct it, as discussed above, by including contributions to
social security and excluding pension benefits from the measure of disposable income.
(This correction and the variables used to compute it are also discussed in detail in
the Appendix posted on our websites). The ‘corrected’ age-saving profile resembles
more closely that predicted by the life-cycle hypothesis. One point that is worth
10We do not observe social security contributions paid by firms. Consistent with the rules of the
German social security system we assume that firms pay a contribution on behalf of their workers
equal to that paid by the workers themselves.
11To be precise, the mis-reporting does not concern the total pension payments received, since
part of these are an implicit return on pension wealth, and therefore are indeed income. We have
overlooked this fact. For a discussion of this correction see Jappelli and Modigliani (2005).
12We do not observe contributions to private pension plans possibly made by firms and we thus
overlook them.
13Here we use disposable income as the denominator for comparability with the U.S. data.
14This fact is well known from the work of Borsch-Supan et al. (1991, 2001) and Borsch-Supan
(2003). Poterba (1994) makes the same observation for Japan. The age profile of the Japanese saving
rate reported by Poterba is also shown in Figure 1.
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highlighting are the positive saving rates of households headed by the young–while
U.S. households headed by the young on average dis-save as shown in Figure 2.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3]
A word of caution is needed here. The corrected measure of saving that we
have built should be considered with some prudence. To compute it we have used
information on employees’ contributions to private pension plans, but not—as we have
already mentioned—on the contributions paid by employers to such plans (because
these are not reported in the survey). The correction is thus only partial. (Note
however that employers’ contributions to the public system are correctly imputed). We
have also assumed that contributions are regarded as a form of saving, something that
is far from obvious in a PAYG system. Treating pension income as negative saving is
also troublesome: for instance in a perpetual youth model, pension wealth does not
decrease with age. Something similar may be happening with the contributions to,
and the income from, private pension plans. We thus run our regressions using both
the reported and the corrected definition of saving.
Table 2 shows sample statistics on the reported and the corrected saving rates
(as a percentage of disposable income) by pension status of the head of household.
Reported saving rates are generally similar across groups, and all groups display
a wide within-group variation. The overall mean reported saving rate, as a per-
cent of disposable income, is 9.4%: this is higher for civil servants and also for self-
employed/professionals. Retirees also display significantly positive reported savings.
Though some respondents claim to save up to almost 90% of their disposable in-
come, the median reported saving rate for high savers (90th percentile) is 30%. As
expected, correcting saving rates boosts the saving rate of those in employment, and
causes positive reported saving to become negative for retirees. 
3.2 Hours worked
The GSOEP survey reports the hours worked by the head and other members of
the household each week in their main job and, possibly, in other, secondary, jobs.
The questions asked are: ‘How many hours do your actual working-hours consist of,
including possible over time? ’. We are able to identify whether a person works, in
her main job, full-time, regular part-time or occasionally, from the answer to the
question ‘Are you currently engaged in paid employment? Which of the following
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applies best to your status?’. A related question asks respondents to ignore their
main job, and consider additional employment (‘It is possible to work in addition to
regular employment, household work, education and also as pensioner. How many days
a month do you engage in this additional employment? How many hours on average
on these days?’); the answer to this question allows us to construct a measure of
hours worked in secondary employment.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the number of weekly hours worked by the
head of household (top panel), the number of household members who work (second
panel), the average weekly hours per head of household who works part time in their
primary employment (about 10% of all those in employment, displayed in panel 3),
and, in panel 4, the average number of hours worked in a 2nd job (by those who also
have a main job). About 70% of households contain only a single worker (usually
the head of household), and most heads of household work on average 30-40 hours
per week. PAYG household heads are more likely to work part-time (around 11% of
PAYG workers work part-time compared to around 4%-6% in the other categories),
but part-time workers in all categories work similar numbers of hours on average (20-
25 per week). Though some of the 2046 PAYG workers are employed for up to 7
hours per week in a second job, second jobs are very rare and even the 90th percentile
of the distribution works an average of 0.3 hours per week in such employment. In
fact only 50 of the 2046 PAYG workers in the balanced sample in 1998 engage in
1 hour or more of secondary employment per week (9 of these 50 work full-time
in their primary employment; the remainder are part-time employed in their main
employment). In the balanced sample of 188 civil servants, only 7 of these engage
in secondary employment (in 1998) and all of these are part-time civil servants in
the main job. We shall therefore study whether part-time employment oﬀers workers
greater flexibility, but we shall not use the information on secondary employment
because the number of workers involved is far too small, at least in our balanced
sample. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Our diﬀ-in-diﬀ results are driven by diﬀerences across groups in the way their saving
rates move over time. It is thus important to be reassured that such changes do not
reflect diﬀerences in the age profile of the various groups. Although the propensity
scores have already reassured us, to further check that this is not the case, Figure 4
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shows the age distribution of the heads of household in the balanced panel (by head of
household’s age in 1998). Age profiles are not very diﬀerent across groups: the hump
of the age-distribution for all groups is around the age of 40-45, although the age
profile of retirees is obviously pushed much further to the right. The age distribution
of those who wish to leave Germany is bimodal with peaks around the age of 30 and
just before retirement. However, to make sure that our results are not driven by age
diﬀerences across the various groups, in our regressions we shall include household
fixed-eﬀects. Since age is a fixed eﬀect, to the extent that it might contribute to
heterogeneity in saving behaviour, fixed eﬀects will capture it.
Diﬀerences in the level (and in the change over time) of the saving rate of diﬀerent
groups could also be driven by the number of children living at home. This is shown
in Figure 5. The number of children living at home is not very diﬀerent across groups:
in most groups at least half of the households have no children living at home; the
number of children leaving at home falls to zero for retirees–as one would have
expected. No household has more than 7 children living at home; only 13 households
(from over 4,000) have more than 4 children living in the house. Figure 6 shows that
the pattern of the number of children living in the household matches the life-cycle,
peaking during the head of household’s forties.
The within group distribution of household disposable income is also similar across
groups (Figure 7). On average, professionals and self-employed are the richest group
(mean household disposable income in 1998 is €40,500) although their distribution is
the least concentrated. Civil servants are generally paid very well (€38,800) and also
have the lowest within group variation. The poorest group are pensioners (€21,000).
Overall these results confirm what we learned form propensity scores. 
There is a statistically significant downward trend in the household saving rate:
over the six year period of our balanced sample the average change in the saving rate
(controlling for household and time fixed eﬀects) is -0.13 per cent per year. This–
as we discuss in the next section–motivates our use, as dependent variable, of the
change in the household saving rate.
4 Saving Results
We identify the eﬀect on household saving of the increase in uncertainty induced by
Chancellor Shroeder’s decision to revoke Kohl’s pension reform using a diﬀ-in-diﬀ
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estimator. The “treated group” includes those households whose pension status was
aﬀected by the introduction and by the subsequent revocation of the reform. This
group (the PAYG individuals) includes the majority (60%) of German households in
our balanced sample. The “control group” consists of those households which were
unaﬀected by the changes in the rules concerning public pensions: in our benchmark
specification this group includes households which are headed by a career civil servant
and those planning to leave Germany. We thus define
treatedi,t =
(
0 if unaﬀected by the Kohl reform
1 otherwise
Since we observe the month in which the interview is conducted, we can precisely
identify those who are aware of the reform and of its subsequent revocation. For
instance, during the course of 1998, we know which households were interviewed when
the Kohl reform was still in place, and which were interviewed after the September
elections.
The saving rates of the individual households in our sample display diﬀerent
trends: in most cases (as discussed in the previous section) the saving rate tends
to fall over time (in the years we are considering), though at diﬀerent speed for
diﬀerent households. To estimate the response of the household saving rate to the
treatment, and to separate this eﬀect from the trend change in the saving rate, we
use, as dependent variable, the change in the saving rate and include household fixed
eﬀects 15.
Our baseline regression in diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence form is
∆srit = αi + βt + θxit + ψ(cs_reformt ∗ cs)
+δ1reformt + τ1 (reformt ∗ treatedi,t)
+δ2revoket + τ2 (revoket ∗ treatedi,t) + εit (1)
where ∆srit is the change in the saving rate measured in percentage points, αi and
βt are household and time fixed eﬀects respectively 16 and xit is a vector of controls
(for instance household disposable income). The coeﬃcient we are most interested in
is τ2 which tells whether the behavior of treated households–that is those households
whose pension status was aﬀected by the introduction and the subsequent revocation
15An additional advantage of using the change in saving rates as our dependent variable is that
those households who move from zero to positive saving, or vice versa, can be analysed in the same
regression without worrying about the truncation at zero of our dependent variable.
16Fixed eﬀects remove the need for a separate treatedi,t regressor.
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of the reform–diﬀers from the behavior of our controls: a positive value of τ2 is a
measure of the extent of precautionary saving. τ1 measures a more standard eﬀect:
the shift in the saving rate resulting from the announcement of Kohl’s pension re-
form by those households who were aﬀected. A positive value of τ1 indicates that
households whose pension status was aﬀected by Kohl’s reform increased their sav-
ings (more precisely shifted the change in their saving rate up) oﬀsetting the cut in
pension wealth.
Our baseline results use the standard definition of saving–reported saving as a
percent of disposable income–and are obtained from the balanced panel extending
over six years, 1995-2000. The results are presented in Table 4 17. The first column of
the table shows the baseline results with no controls beyond the time and household
fixed-eﬀects. The estimate of τ2 (reported in the second row of Table 4) is both
statistically (at the 95% level) and economically significant. A coeﬃcient of 1.311
indicates that following the revocation of the reform (that is in the years 1998, 1999
and 2000) treated households have, on average, increased the change in their saving
rate by 1.311 percentage points per year. This means, for instance, that a treated
household that previously was holding savings constant at 9.8% of disposable income
(the average saving rate for the balanced sample in 1997) would, ceteris paribus, have
a saving rate of about 13.7% by the year 2000.
Column (2) adds a control for the change in household disposable income and
column (3) controls for diﬀerent (perhaps time-varying) characteristics of the head of
household. In both cases the eﬀect of the revocation is made stronger (the estimated
eﬀect on the yearly change in the saving rate rises from 1.311 to 2.094) and remains
statistically significant. Columns (4) and (5) correct for the unavailability of the
“Germany leaver” data in 1995: in column (4) we use the data on intention to leave
Germany from 1996 to fill in for the missing 1995 data; in column (5) we simply drop
the data from 1995 onwards. In all cases the estimate of τ2 remains significant.
Interestingly our estimates of τ1 (reported in the first row of Table 4) are never
significant: households whose pension status was aﬀected by Kohl’s reform do not
appear to have responded to the news by changing the path of their saving rate so as
to oﬀset the cut in pension wealth. This result runs against the findings in Attanasio
and Brugiavini (2003). It is probably due to the fact that what we are estimating are
diﬀerences between treated and controls: both civil servants (the larger group among
17Some of the control variables are dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity; this is
especially the case when 0-1 dummies correlate perfectly with fixed eﬀects variables. Such variables
are marked with a "-" in the coeﬃcient cells of the tables.
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our controls) and PAYG individuals were hit by a change in rules during 1997: civil
servants in January, PAYG individuals in August. An insignificant estimate of τ1 is
telling us that PAYG workers did not react to the reform that hit them more than
civil servants did to the change in their own rules.
[Insert Table 4]
4.1 Robustness
Tables 5 and 6 present some robustness tests. Table 5 considers diﬀerent definitions
of the saving rate: column (1) reproduces, for comparison, column (3) of Table 4
(balanced sample with controls); column (2) uses, as dependent variable, instead of
reported savings the corrected saving rate (percent of disposable income); columns
(3) and (4) use consumption as the scaling factor, respectively for the reported and
corrected saving rates. In all cases, the revocation dummy remains statistically sig-
nificant and its size increases when we use the corrected saving rate, and again when
we use consumption as the scaling variable. In terms of the magnitude of the eﬀect
on the corrected saving rate, consider that in 1997 the average household where the
worker is not of retirement age had a corrected saving rate equal to 26.5% of dispos-
able income; according to the estimates in column (2) the corrected saving rate of
such a household would, ceteris paribus, have increased to reach, by the year 2000,
33.7% of disposable income .
Table 6 considers diﬀerent samples and controls. Again, column (1) repeats col-
umn (3) of Table 4 (balanced sample with baseline controls). Column (2) uses the
unbalanced panel and the results are similar; column (3) includes only civil servants
in the control group (results are similar and statistically significant at the 12% level);
column (4) uses the balanced sample but also includes self-employed and professionals
in the control group. A final concern–as we mentioned–is that a household may
be headed by a civil servant but include some members who belong to the PAYG
system. In order to control for this possibility, in column (5) we repeat our baseline
regression using only those households where the head of household is the only worker
throughout the sample. In all cases our revocation dummy remains both statistically
and economically significant. 
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4.2 Is the eﬀect on saving age-dependent?
Our results suggest that greater uncertainty about the future of pensions induces
higher precautionary savings. Is this eﬀect concentrated on particular age groups, or
does it occur throughout the age distribution? Gourinchas and Parker (2001) show
that the precautionary saving motive is especially important at young ages, while
it becomes negligible for older households who, on average, hold large amounts of
liquid wealth. Their model however excluded pension wealth. Our data allows to test
whether the precautionary saving induced by the uncertainty regarding the future
of pensions aﬀects individuals diﬀerently depending on their age. Relatively older
individuals have a shorter working-life horizon and thus must save relatively more to
achieve a given increase in wealth.
Since we use fixed eﬀects we cannot include an “age” control 18. Thus, to test
for an age eﬀect, we need to explore alternative routes. We keep using a fixed eﬀect
estimator, but create an age dummy variable defined as
D(agei) =
(
0 if head of household <50 in 1998
1 otherwise
We then estimate the following equation
∆SRit = αi + βt + θxit + ψ(CS_reform ∗ civil_servant)
...+ δ1reformt + τ1 (reformt ∗ treatedi,t)
...+ δ2revoket + τ2 (revoket ∗ treatedi,t)
...+ τ3(D(agei) ∗ revoket ∗ treatedi,t) + εit (2)
The results when we estimate this equation using the balanced sample for each of
the diﬀerent definitions of saving are presented in Table 7.
The dependent variable in the regressions are, respectively, reported saving as a
% of disposable income (column (1)), corrected saving as a % of disposable income
(column (2)), reported saving as a % of consumption (column (3)), and corrected
saving as a % of consumption (column (4)). In all cases there is no evidence that the
18Even though age is time-varying, demeaning it (as fixed eﬀects does) would transform this variable
in a household-specific trend. We have tested whether we could drop fixed eﬀects by running a
Hausman test which compares the consistent (though not necessarily eﬃcient) fixed-eﬀects model
(FE) with a random eﬀects model (RE). The null hypothesis that the RE and the FE coeﬃcients are
identical is rejected (Prob > χ2 = 0.0115).
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eﬀect on savings of the revocation of the reform is age-specific This result is robust
to the specifications in Tables 5 and 6 and also to diﬀerent age thresholds in the
definition of D(agei). The absence of an age eﬀect may be the result of two forces
working in opposite directions: older individuals have shorter horizons, but their
pension rights are largely pre-determined. Younger workers have more time to make
up for a reduction in their pension wealth, but such a reduction is more significant
than for older workers. Thus an increase in uncertainty about the future of pensions
will aﬀect consumption throughout the age distribution. 
5 Hours Results
As mentioned in the introduction, additional savings can be achieved either by con-
suming less or by working more. We analyze the eﬀects on labor supply of the un-
certainty created by the revocation of Kohl’s pension reform considering regressions
similar to those just discussed but using, on the left-hand side, labor supply variables
rather than the change in the saving rate. The German labour market is relatively
rigid: it is unclear the extent to which work contracts allow employees to change their
working hours; overtime is also strictly regulated. Workers however can adjust their
labor supply using the margin oﬀered to those in part-time employment or by taking
second jobs. As discussed in Section 3.2, around 10% of workers in our balanced sam-
ple are part-time workers, while very few work significant hours in second jobs - of
the 2,046 PAYG workers in full- or part-time employment, only 49 work on average
1 hour or more per week in a 2nd job in 1998 (this number is reasonably constant
across years).
Using various measures of hours worked we estimate the following equation:
hoursit = αi + βt + θ.xit + ψ(cs_reformt ∗ cs)
+δ1reformt + τ1 (reformt ∗ treatedi,t)
+δ2revoket + τ2 (revoket ∗ treatedi,t) + εit (3)
Our results are in Table 8. In columns (1) and (2), the object of the analysis is the
number of hours worked by the head of household (as shown in Table 3, the majority
of households contain only a single worker). In column (1) we consider total weekly
hours worked by the head of the household in her primary employment. In column
(2) we restrict the analysis to heads of household for whom primary employment is
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part-time. In columns (3) and (4) we shift the focus to the hours worked by other
household members (excluding the hours worked by the head of household); column
(3) limits the sample to households in which the head is a full-time worker, while
column (4) focuses on the households headed by part-time workers (as in column
(2)). In all cases we exclude income from the right-hand -side variables as this is
endogenous to the amount of hours worked.
The estimate of τ2, the diﬀ-in-diﬀ eﬀect on hours of the revocation of the reform,
varies depending on whether the head of household works full time or part time. In
general (column 1) there is no evidence of a labor supply response—a result which is
consistent with the rigidity of German labor contracts. However (column (2)) house-
hold heads who work only part-time–and thus presumably have more flexibility–do
appear to use this flexibility: following the revocation of the pension reform their
hours increase significantly (at the 10% level). The point estimate, 4.386, means that
a head of household working part-time, who previously worked 22 hours per week
(the average part-time hours per week in 1998) would have increased her hours to 26
hours per week–an economically significant increase.
The regressions in Column (3) and (4) examine the additional hours worked by
household members other than the head of the household, distinguishing between
households in which the head works full or part time. In either case there is no
evidence of a labor supply eﬀect for these workers. We obtained similar, insignificant
results (not reported here) when we investigated whether the number of workers
increased in households aﬀected by the revocation of the reform. 
6 Conclusions
The results in this paper are of interest from three diﬀerent perspectives. First, we
provide a direct measure of precautionary saving studying how households respond to
an exogenous increase in uncertainty about the path of future income. Our estimate of
precautionary savings are the result of a quasi-natural experiment and thus overcome
the identification problem that often aﬀects such measures: the findings point to a
significant increase in precautionary saving following an increase in uncertainty about
the future path of income. Second, we find evidence of a labor supply response by
workers who can use the margin oﬀered by part-time employment: this eﬀect however
is only marginally significant. Third, from a political economy perspective, our results
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indicate that households react to the reversal of a previously adopted reform and, more
generally, to the delaying of reforms that are considered eventually unavoidable. This
suggests that political deadlocks not only have the eﬀect of postponing reforms–
and thus eventually making them more diﬃcult–but may also induce a slowdown in
the economy by inducing households to cut their consumption—an eﬀect that is only
partially compensated by a positive labor supply response. Interestingly we find that
such an eﬀect is not limited to households headed by older workers, but aﬀects all
households, independently of the age of the household head.
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Figure 1: Propensity Scores - Probability of Not Being Treated
The horizontal axis shows the estimated probability of not being treated measured from a panel logit regression of "not being
treated" that is being headed by a civil servant on various controls including a household xed e¤ect. The vertical axis
shows the percent of households in each group.
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Figure 3: Reported and Corrected Saving Rates in Germany in 1998 by age of the head of the household.
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Figure 5: Number of Children Living in the Household in 1998 by Pension Status (Balanced Sample)
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Figure 7: Distribution of Household Disposable Income in 1998 (Balanced Sample)
Table 1: Sample Size and Basic Household Characteristics: balanced and unbalanced samples
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1998
unbalanced samples balanced panel
1995-2000
Total who report income 6,454 6,329 6,382 7,036 6,913 12,448 4,532
by household saving
o/w positive saving 3,999 3,880 3,928 4,207 4,166 7,386 2,854
o/w saving unreported 2,455 2,449 2,454 2,829 2,747 5,062 1,678
by labour force participation
o/w full-time 3,552 3,379 3,367 3,688 3,607 6,244 2,360
o/w part-time 24 370 366 385 470 888 245
o/w unemployed 537 557 561 578 481 799 376
o/w retired 1,355 1,324 1,549 1,856 1,826 3,526 1,259
o/w out of the labor force 986 699 539 529 529 991 292
by public pension status
o/w PAYG individuals 4,219 4,122 3,927 4,244 4,219 7,430 2,645
o/w professionals/self-emp 271 270 288 341 341 620 244
o/w pensioner 1,355 1,324 1,549 1,856 1,826 3,526 1259
o/w prospective leaver - 361 348 287 233 307 196
o/w civil servant 260 252 270 308 294 565 188
Table 2: Reported and Corrected Saving Rate by Pension Status in 1998: balanced sample, 1995-2000
Statistics
Variable N mean sd min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All 4532 9.4 11.6 0 87 0 0 6 14 25
Reported PAYG individuals 2645 8.4 10.6 0 87 0 0 5 13 22
saving rate Professional/Self-emp 244 9.8 13.7 0 68 0 0 4 14 29
(% disp. income) Pensioner 1259 11.6 13.0 0 78 0 0 8 18 30
Germany Leaver 196 7.4 11.1 0 50 0 0 0 12 25
Civil Servant 188 12.1 10.4 0 59 0 5 9 16 28
All 4532 1.1 49.2 -127.6 115.9 -87.0 -26.9 21.8 35.3 46.1
Corrected PAYG individuals 2645 27.4 24.4 -106.5 115.9 0.0 20.1 30.8 40.3 49.9
saving rate Professional/Self-emp 244 18.3 19.4 -52.3 87.5 0.0 5.6 15.9 28.3 44.7
(% disp. income) Pensioner 1259 -65.2 34.9 -127.6 58.7 -99.0 -91.2 -77.4 -46.9 -10.3
Germany Leaver 196 30.1 16.4 -32.9 84.0 9.1 22.5 30.3 38.6 50.1
Civil Servant 188 23.1 13.5 -22.9 73.4 10.1 14.7 20.5 29.6 41.6
Table 3: Hours and Workers by Labor Force Status (Balanced Sample)
Statistics
Variable N mean sd min max p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All 4532 23.4 22.3 0 100 0 0 33 42 50
PAYG individuals 2645 31.0 20.1 0 83 0 0 39 45 50
Hours Worked Professional/Self-emp 244 39.8 23.7 0 100 0 21 47 59 65
by Head of Household Pensioner 1259 0.9 5.7 0 70 0 0 0 0 0
Germany Leaver 196 29.6 20.0 0 90 0 0 38 40 45
Civil Servant 188 39.6 11.0 0 78 30 39 40 45 50
All 4532 1.1 0.9 0 5 0 0 1 2 2
PAYG individuals 2645 1.4 0.8 0 5 0 1 1 2 2
Workers Per Household Professional/Self-emp 244 1.5 0.6 0 4 1 1 2 2 2
Pensioner 1259 0.4 0.7 0 4 0 0 0 1 1
Germany Leaver 196 1.5 0.9 0 4 1 1 1 2 3
Civil Servant 188 1.6 0.6 0 3 1 1 2 2 2
All 245 22 11 0 80 8 15 21 30 35
PAYG individuals 217 22.1 11.0 0 80 9 15 21 30 35
Part-time Hours Professional/Self-emp 14 17.9 11.6 0 40 0 7 19.4 25 30
(given Part-time worker) Pensioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Germany Leaver 6 20.9 5.3 15 31 15 19.5 20 20 31
Civil Servant 8 25.9 6.5 19.5 37 19.5 20 25 30.25 37
All 2605 0.1 0.4 0 6.9 0 0 0 0 0.3
PAYG individuals 2046 0.1 0.4 0 6.9 0 0 0 0 0.3
Weekly 2nd-Job Hours Professional/Self-emp 223 0.2 0.6 0 4.9 0 0 0 0.1 0.5
(given employed) Pensioner 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
Germany Leaver 148 0.1 0.3 0 1.9 0 0 0 0 0.4
Civil Servant 188 0.1 0.5 0 4.8 0 0 0 0 0.3
Table 4: Saving Regressions - Baseline results using the reported saving rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SR SR SR SR SR
(% income) (% income) (% income) (% income) (% income)
D(reform)*treatment -0.686 -0.392 0.329 -0.131 0.318
(-0.94) (-0.54) (0.42) (-0.14) (0.40)
D(revoke)*treatment 1.311** 1.428** 2.094*** 2.308*** 2.100***
(2.09) (2.29) (3.00) (2.77) (2.99)
D(reform) -1.579 -2.481 -3.043 -1.812 -2.880
(-0.61) (-0.97) (-1.18) (-0.68) (-1.11)
D(revoke) -2.204 -2.602 -3.303 -2.698 -2.759
(-0.62) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-0.75) (-0.77)
D(CS_reform) 0.992 1.261 1.588*   1.386
(1.24) (1.58) (1.85) () (1.45)
 income -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-13.9) (-13.9) (-12.9) (-13.1)
D(PAYG individ) -1.480**   -1.783**
(-2.26) () (-2.37)
D(prof./sel-emp)      
() () ()
D(retired)   7.827  
() (1.16) ()
D(Germany leaver)   1.466**  
() (2.16) ()
D(civil servant) 0.210   1.611
(0.14) () (0.85)
D(unemployed) -1.689*** -1.703*** -1.502***
(-4.53) (-4.56) (-3.54)
Constant 1.177 1.366 2.960 0.767 1.179
(0.33) (0.39) (0.83) (0.22) (1.61)
Controls Civil service & leavers
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 18338 18338 18338 17240 15273
Number of households 3543 3543 3543 3372 3426
All regressions include household xed-e¤ects and time xed-e¤ects.
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity
are indicated with a "-" in the coe¢ cient cells of the tables.
Table 5: Saving Regression - Di¤erent Denitions of Saving
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR  corrected SR SR  corrected SR
(% income) (% income) (% cons) (% cons)
D(reform)*treatment 0.329 0.686 1.829 2.942
(0.42) (0.64) (1.03) (1.27)
D(revoke)*treatment 2.094*** 2.405** 3.610** 4.923**
(3.00) (2.55) (2.30) (2.40)
D(reform) -3.043 -5.070 -6.044 -10.537
(-1.18) (-1.46) (-1.05) (-1.40)
D(revoke) -3.303 -4.498 -5.182 -8.256
(-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.65) (-0.79)
D(CS_reform) 1.588* 2.757** 3.043 4.952**
(1.85) (2.38) (1.57) (1.96)
 income -1.480** -1.197 -2.535 7.111*
(-2.26) (-1.36) (-0.80) (1.72)
D(PAYG individ)        
() () () ()
D(prof./sel-emp)        
() () () ()
D(retired)     0.035 10.013**
() () (0.0100) (2.20)
D(Germany leaver) 0.210 -8.788***    
(0.14) (-4.20) () ()
D(civil servant) -1.689*** -7.001*** -2.445*** -8.559***
(-4.53) (-13.9) (-2.91) (-7.81)
D(unemployed) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-13.9) (-10.2) (-11.0) (-9.67)
Constant 2.960 3.472 4.349 -3.615
(0.83) (0.72) (0.52) (-0.33)
Controls Civil service & leavers
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 18338 18338 18336 18336
Number of households 3543 3543 3543 3543
All regressions include household xed-e¤ects and time xed-e¤ects.
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity
are indicated with a "-" in the coe¢ cient cells of the tables.
Table 6: Saving Regression - Alternate Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SR SR SR SR SR
(% income) (% income) (% income) (% income) (% income)
D(reform)*treatment 0.329 0.018 0.832 -0.150 -0.410
(0.42) (0.025) (0.61) (-0.25) (-0.29)
D(revoke)*treatment 2.094*** 1.693*** 1.956 1.169** 3.137***
(3.00) (2.64) (1.54) (2.32) (2.59)
D(reform) -3.043 -2.786 -3.695 -1.630 -0.658
(-1.18) (-1.41) (-1.30) (-0.68) (-0.16)
D(revoke) -3.303 -1.584 -5.922 -1.499 -6.052
(-0.93) (-0.60) (-1.50) (-0.44) (-0.98)
D(CS_reform) 1.588* 1.173 1.654 0.970 1.887
(1.85) (1.49) (1.34) (1.26) (1.18)
 income -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003***
(-13.9) (-16.5) (-12.7) (-13.8) (-6.97)
D(PAYG individ) -1.690 -0.942 -1.704 1.020 -3.386***
(-1.20) (-1.64) (-1.22) (0.43) (-3.09)
D(prof./sel-emp) - - - - -
() () () () ()
D(retired) - - - - -
() () () () ()
D(Germany leaver) -0.210 - - 2.101 0.000
(-0.14) () () (0.87) ()
D(civil servant) - 0.230 - 1.994 -0.499
() (0.16) () (0.75) (-0.16)
D(unemployed) -1.689*** -1.794*** -1.746*** -1.939*** -1.648***
(-4.53) (-5.38) (-4.55) (-5.23) (-2.78)
Constant 1.391 0.664 6.003 -1.219 2.606**
(1.04) (1.09) (1.51) (-0.55) (2.25)
Controls Baseline Baseline Only Civil Baseline Baseline
Servants 1 worker HH
Balanced Sample 1995-2000 No 1995-2000 1995-2000 1995-2000
Observations 18338 25542 17380 19743 5702
Number of households 3543 6378 3531 3783 1125
All regressions include household xed-e¤ects and time xed-e¤ects.
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity
are indicated with a "-" in the coe¢ cient cells of the tables.
Table 7: Looking for an age e¤ect of precautionary saving
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR  corrected SR SR  corrected SR
(% income) (% income) (% cons) (% cons)
D(reform)*treatment 0.349 1.216 1.885 3.571
(0.40) (1.05) (0.94) (1.36)
D(revoke)*treatment 2.567** 2.254 4.501* 4.553
(2.30) (1.51) (1.76) (1.36)
D(reform) -3.360 -6.341* -6.457 -12.148
(-1.24) (-1.75) (-1.04) (-1.49)
D(revoke) -5.181 -6.296 -7.939 -11.768
(-1.35) (-1.23) (-0.90) (-1.02)
D(agei)*D(revoke)*treatment -0.013 -0.001 -0.021 0.009
(-0.70) (-0.023) (-0.48) (0.15)
D(CS_reform) 1.769* 3.198** 3.451 5.765**
(1.90) (2.57) (1.61) (2.06)
 income -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-10.1) (-7.31) (-7.23) (-6.50)
D(PAYG individ) -1.904 7.378*** -2.622 -3.479
(-1.28) (3.73) (-1.58) (-1.60)
D(prof./sel-emp)        
() () () ()
D(retired)        
() () () ()
D(Germany leaver) -0.226 9.137***    
(-0.14) (4.15) () ()
D(civil servant)     0.147 -10.367**
() () (0.039) (-2.09)
D(unemployed) -1.414*** -6.749*** -2.010** -8.110***
(-3.49) (-12.5) (-2.16) (-6.66)
Constant 1.622 -4.904*** 6.633 11.322
(1.15) (-2.60) (0.75) (0.98)
Controls Civil service & leavers
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 18338 18338 18338 17240
Number of households 3543 3543 3543 3372
All regressions include household xed-e¤ects and time xed-e¤ects.
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity
are indicated with a "-" in the coe¢ cient cells of the tables.
Table 8: Labour Hours Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH Head HH Head Non-Head Non-Head
Hours Hours Other Hours Other Hours
Part-time Full-time Head Part-time Head
D(reform)*treatment -0.160 -0.153 0.156 -0.137
(-0.20) (-0.055) (0.35) (-0.040)
D(revoke)*treatment -0.743 4.386* -0.022 -2.101
(-1.07) (1.65) (-0.054) (-0.65)
D(reform) -6.789*** -9.069 -0.407 -0.980
(-2.70) (-1.52) (-0.26) (-0.13)
D(revoke) -3.142 -5.537 -0.997 -17.903
(-0.90) (-0.53) (-0.47) (-1.41)
D(CS_reform) -0.156 1.049 0.056 -0.692
(-0.18) (0.32) (0.12) (-0.17)
 income Omitted
D(PAYG individ) -10.833*** -2.120 0.412 -0.939
(-7.85) (-0.58) (1.06) (-0.21)
D(prof./sel-emp) - - - -
() () () ()
D(retired) - - - -
() () () ()
D(Germany leaver) -11.295*** - - -
(-7.42) () () ()
D(civil servant) - -9.710* -0.364 11.348
() (-1.68) (-0.38) (1.60)
D(unemployed) -30.696*** 1.974 -1.301 5.931
(-83.5) (0.62) (-0.66) (1.53)
Constant 45.379*** 26.211*** 1.559*** 12.290***
(34.5) (7.11) (3.81) (2.72)
Controls Civil service & leavers
Balanced Sample 1995-2000
Observations 18741 1113 13067 1113
Number of households 3555 457 2754 457
All regressions include household xed-e¤ects and time xed-e¤ects.
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Control variables dropped automatically by Stata due to multicollinearity
are indicated with a "-" in the coe¢ cient cells of the tables.
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